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1. Introduction 
Corruption as a phenomenon of abuse of power exists in every country. It is the 
vulnerability of political institutions compounded of a variety of complicated factors. 
Corruption affects adversely long-term economic growth, human development, social 
stability and so on in the countries which do not have effective government 
institutions and government system. Increasing numbers of countries pay great 
attention to curbing corruption for protecting the development of countries from 
corruption. The General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption and requested that the Secretary-General designate the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the secretariat for the Convention’s 
Conference of States Parties on 31 October 2003. (un.org, 2016) As of 2014, already 
139 countries on board. (Nie, 2014) This is perhaps a sufficient account of the great 
degree of attention paid to corruption by most of the world’s nations. China as one of 
developing countries is also suffering from corruption. Recently, anti-corruption 
campaign has been strengthened since China’s top leader Xi Jinping unveil the “Four 
Comprehensives”, which is his new political theory. “Comprehensively strictly 
govern the Party” as one of the “Four Comprehensives” reflects the determinations 
and ambitions of President Xi to prosecute anti-corruption campaign. However, it is 
simply not enough to depend on the Chinese Communist Party itself to achieve the 
goal of reducing corruption. After all, regardless of the Chinese political system, it is 
generally known that eliminating corruption is a tricky challenge. Initially, there are 
many different determinants result in corruption. Anticorruption requires figuring 
these determinants out in a specific context. Moreover, these determinants relate to 
various aspects involve economic, institutional, and social factors. And these 
determinants themselves have inner relevance. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the 
corruption to one determinant. In addition, precisely because of these complex 
relationships between these determinants, the characteristics of corruption are 
complex, dynamic, and multifaceted. It is impossible to resolve the issue in a simple 
method. Subsequently, the successful governing approaches in anticorruption actions 
in one country may not apply to other countries. Anticorruption in different contexts 
  
requires appropriate strategies to comply with situations and conditions. Different 
institutional systems, the level of economic development and societal contexts 
determine the diversity of anti-corruption methods. The populous has varying levels 
of comprehension and tolerance about corruption and corrupt behaviors in different 
contexts. Moreover, the interests of the populous and rulers in a different context may 
result in varying opinions on how hard to push anticorruption institutions. Lastly, 
corruption is always hidden. Even if effective anti-corruption measures lead massive 
corruption cases to be exposed, corruption still occurs far too often. It is impossible to 
eliminate corruption completely. It means that combating corruption is not a 
short-term agenda. It requires long-term efforts to make corruption can be controlled 
at an ideal level for ensuring development in other aspects.  
 
Certainly, even though resolving corruption is complex, some factors can still curb 
corruption. These factors may benefit Chinese government to achieve the aim of 
curbing corruption. Many corruption cases were disclosed through both traditional 
media and the Internet in recent years. The Chinese central government has shown 
active attitudes and indicated explicitly its willingness to support “network 
anti-corruption” and public participation in fighting corruption. Meanwhile, existing 
research has illustrated the active effects of civil society on corruption but with certain 
conditions. (Grimes, 2013) But it is not quite clear whether these theories can be 
applied in the Chinese case. Therefore, the paper speculates that civil society may 
curb corruption or even the effects had been made in China. This paper takes 
advantage of the rise of civil society and transparency about disclosure of corruption 
and to find a relationship between societal accountability and the level of corruption 
under China’s present situation and to explore how the rising transparency and 
societal accountability affect anti-corruption activities. Thus, the broad research 
question is: Does societal accountability reduce corruption in general in China and if 
so, how?  
 
  
This paper is a quantitative research at the sub-national level. Previous quantitative 
studies on corruption mainly focus on the cross-national level analysis. Even though 
some Chinese scholars provide quantitative research in sub-national level, however, 
most research concentrates on corruption and economic efficiency. Less research 
investigates the relationship between corruption and civil society. This paper may be 
able to fill this gap. The paper is structured as follows. The following section 
introduces a discussion about corruption. It involves the concept of corruption, 
determinants of corruption in both China perspective and extensive perspective, and 
Chinese anti-corruption agencies and mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the concept 
of accountability and transparency, the rise of transparency and accountability in 
China and discusses the relationship between transparency, accountability, and 
corruption. Section 4 provides hypotheses. Section 5 focuses on data and model 
specification. Section 6 analyzes the results of regressions. The last section is the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Discussion 
2.1 Concepts of corruption 
This section provides a review about mainstreaming features and types of corruption. 
It assists in understanding the difficulties of defining corruption by one single theory. 
In addition, it benefits the paper and readers to comprehend the Chinese corruption on 
the base of this literature review later in the article.  
 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon. It has gained a great deal of attention since the 
1990s. Corruption has been defined by a lot of scholars and international 
organizations in many ways. Some scholars introduce the broad characteristics of 
corruption. For instance, “corruption is a cross-systemic, cross-temporal and 
cross-cultural phenomenon. It can exist in any country, at any time, and under any 
form of government”. (Farrales, 2005) “It is a complex, dynamic and multifaceted 
phenomenon that can take a variety of forms”. “It is a collective challenge. It involves 
  
a variety of interactions, dynamics, and linkages between multiple actors, 
organizations, and institutions at different levels”. (Menocal et al., 2015) The most 
widely used, classic and popular definition is “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”.(Svensson, 2005; Tanzi, 1998; Transparency International; World Bank, 
1997) Although scholars have put forward a variety of theoretical and data evidence 
to assist people to comprehend corruption. However, not surprisingly, there is no 
single theory to describe corruption in its entirety. What can be termed “abuse” relates 
to legal standards, social perceptions of power abuse, historical legacies, institutional 
factors, and many other factors if only consider this widely used definition? Besides, 
the definitions are varied. It seems better to describe the corruption from the type of 
corruption for one certain country if we cannot describe what is corruption in detail by 
one single theory.  
 
Heidenheimer, Johnston, Vine, and Levine (1989) were among the first scholars to 
provide a set of definition of corruption. (González, 2007) Most of “objective” 
definitions derived from their three classifications of definitions of corruption: 
public-office-centered, market-centered and public-interest-centered definitions. 
(González, 2007; Johnston, 1996) Nye (1967) provides a widely acceptable definition 
of the first kind: corruption is “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence”. Market-centered definitions of corruption shift the 
emphasis from the public office to the market. Heidenheimer et al. (1989) introduce 
Van Klaveren’s definition for explaining market-centered kind of corruption as 
following: “A corrupt civil servant who regards his public office as a business, the 
income of which he will … seek to maximize. The office then becomes a 
“maximizing unit”. The size of his income depends … upon the market situation and 
his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve”. Carl 
Friedrich represents public-interest-centered position. He defines corruption: “the 
  
pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged 
with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary of officeholder, is by 
monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which 
favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its 
interests”. (Heidenheimer et al., 1989) Johnston (1996) summarizes these concepts of 
corruption as “behavior-classifying” definitions. He contends that 
behavior-classifying definitions have their advantages. “They do allow us to identify 
patterns of corruption, to consider institutional and political reforms, and to analyze 
the consequence of various corrupt action”. (Johnston, 1996) However, he claims 
these definitions are illusory and not precise. Nas, Price, and Weber (1986) raise a 
similar query on these definitions. They also believe that although these definitions 
contain descriptive advantages, but “they lack the generality essential for an 
analytically useful definition of corruption”. According to Johnston (1996), there are 
several questions to reflect the deficits of Heidenheimer’s definitions. Which norms 
should be applied as standards to decide whether a specific behavior is corrupt or not? 
What is considered private benefit? These doubts may due to the powers and 
limitations of official roles and their relationships with private interests varies 
continuously even in relatively settled political systems. (Johnston, 1996) Therefore, 
he develops these “behavior-classifying” definitions by adding “principal-agent-client” 
definitions. He suggests that researchers may require concentrating on the political 
conflicts shaping the idea of corruption, rather than searching for clearly-defined 
categories of corrupt behavior, especially in transitional or deeply divided societies. 
 
Susan Rose-Ackerman first introduces Principal-Agent theory. But her definition is 
narrow. Robert E. Klitgaard provides broader one. Corrupt behavior occurs when the 
principals unable to monitor and oversight the agents effectively and the agents put 
their own interest ahead of the group’s collective interest. (Klitgaard, 1988) This due 
to the agent creates so-called “information asymmetry” to make the principal difficult 
to supervise the agent to comply with their “appointments”. (Klitgaard, 1988; 
  
Rose-Ackerman, 1978) Therefore, corruption can be controlled if “the principal” are 
empowered enough to monitor “the agent”. (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Stigler, 1974) 
Consequently, most of the current anti-corruption programs base on a principal-agent 
understanding of corruption than any alternative view. (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; 
Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011) Anti-corruption 
interventions from principal-agent perspective always focus on reducing the 
discretion of public servant, increasing monitoring mechanisms, promoting 
transparency in government and strengthening sanctions for improving the ability of 
principals to hold agent account. (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015) However, some scholars 
criticize this theory in terms of anti-corruption interventions. They believe that 
anti-corruption efforts are failed in some contexts due to designs of these 
anti-corruption interventions sometimes base on this inadequate theory. (Marquette & 
Peiffer, 2015) Rothstein (2011) believes that if corruption is really based on the 
"principal-agent" model, it is easy to eliminate corruption, simply by changing 
incentive policies and eliminating corruption. The principal needs to gradually 
increase the cost of fraud and corruption until the agent restrains their own greed and 
corruption due to fear of being arrested. Unfortunately, lacking “principled principals” 
in highly corrupt environments result in the invalidation of principal-agent 
anti-corruption programmes. (Menocal et al., 2015; Rothstein, 2011) Meanwhile, 
institutional settings determine the agent’s strategic environment. The agent expected 
gain from corruption bases on the number of other agents they expect to be corrupt. 
(Bardhan, 1997) The understanding of corruption will be biased and the agent 
collaborates with other agents to corruption and organizes corrupt groups in the 
context of a systemic corruption. Therefore, some scholars tend to support corruption 
should be viewed as a collective action problem rather than a principal-agent problem 
in some countries where corruption is systemic. (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; 
Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; Menocal et al., 2015; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2011) 
The paper provides development of the concept of corruption. However, The question 
concerning how to make a clear definition of corruption remains controversial. It is 
  
hardly possible to provide a universal theory to conclude this crux. Fortunately, 
scholars provide chances to review this challenge in a different light. 
2.2 Determinants of Corruption 
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of corruption. Even though its 
shapes have all kinds of reasons, but they lie in the convergence of the institutional, 
and socio-cultural, historical, and economic dimensions. (Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 
2003; Braun & Tella, 2004; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001; 
Treisman, 2000) In the block of historical and socio-cultural factors, religious culture, 
education are two main factors may result in the occurrence of corruption. Porta 
(1999), Treisman (2000), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show the significant effects of 
religion on corruption. Adserà, Boix, and Payne (2000), Melgar, Rossi, and Smith 
(2010) find no relationship between corruption and religious culture. Melgar et al. 
(2010) also reveal that the level of education has a close relation with the perception 
of corruption. “People who have completed, at least, secondary education are more 
likely to perceive a lower level of corruption”. In addition, “more educated people 
have more information about the current level of corruption and better capacities to 
process the information”. (Melgar et al., 2010) Treisman (2000), Porta (1999), Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) believe good education attainment can reduce 
corruption. Economic factors always are identified as the prime cause of corruption. 
(You & Khagram, 2005) Levels of economic growth, government wages, the structure 
of the economy and trade openness all have a close connection with corruption in the 
economic dimension. Melgar et al. (2010) and Paldam (2002) provide the discussion 
about the relationship between corruption and economic development. They reveal 
that economic development can reduce corruption. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
explain the low level of salaries of civil servants may one important factor to result in 
serious corruption in developing countries. Le, De Haan, and Dietzenbacher (2013) 
and Veldhuizen (2013) provide the evidence to reveal the strong positive impact of 
increasing wages on refraining corruption. Economic freedom or trade openness is an 
additional element to affect corruption. Saha and Gounder (2011), Ades and Di Tella 
  
(1997) show that stronger international trade lower government corruption. However, 
Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Treisman (2000)’s findings do not provide the 
evidence to show positive effects of economic freedom on reducing corruption. 
Institutional dimension is one last significant element discussed in this paper. The 
discussion includes political institutions and economic institutions. Political regime is 
discussed by many scholars when concerning determinants of corruption. They reveal 
that traditional democratic countries may have a lower incidence of corruption due to 
democracy promote anti-corruption activities. (Porta, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) 
Meanwhile, federalism in a state leads to a higher level of corruption. Unitary states 
may bring clean governments. (Gerring & Thacker, 2004) In addition, the functioning 
of political systems may also affect the incidence of corruption. For instance, political 
instability produces more space for corruption. (Melgar et al., 2010) A Competitive 
electoral process contributes more clean government (Treisman, 2000)  Fiscal or 
political decentralization leads to decision-making process closer to the people. 
However, the evidence about the impact of decentralization on reducing corruption is 
inconsistent. Some scholars indicate that the degree of decentralization determines to 
what extent can corruption be reduced. (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Fisman & Gatti, 
2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) But Treisman et al. (2002) 
reveal diametrically opposite opinions. The discussion about determinants of 
corruption above briefly provides most representative causes which lead to the 
incidence of corruption. However, these conclusions are not universal. These 
determinants of corruption will be discussed again for examining whether these 
determinants are suitable for Chinese situation, as the paper will argue in the 
following section. But before that, it is necessary to figure out why some determinants 
of corruption which deteriorate the quality of government do not necessarily work in 
other countries? Exploring the determinants of corruption requires basing on the 
context of one certain country, as same as defining concepts of corruption. Treisman 
(2000) argues that “the official can be construed as balancing the expected cost of a 
corrupt act … against the expected benefit”. It can be understood as the officialdom’s 
  
corrupt strategies base on their perception of risk of exposure and severity of 
punishment. The elements affect the officials’ perception of the risk of exposure and 
severity of punishment can be regarded as determinants of corruption under one fixed 
situation. The political, economic, and societal situations vary from country to country. 
The determinants of corruptions may change based on the context. Hence, studying 
corruption requires understanding background associated with corruption of research 
objects.  
 
2.3 Corruption in China 
Basing on the literature review above, exploring the corruption under one fixed 
context requires to define corruption and understand corruption base on the specific 
background. Therefore, initially, following paper provides an introduction about 
determinants of Chinese corruption. This benefits both author and readers to find 
similarities and differences between Chinese corruption and universal concept of 
corruption. And then the forms of manifestation, the major characteristics of Chinese 
corruption and present China’s anti-corruption activities will be provided. 
 
2.3.1 What are the differences and similarities between China’s corruption and corruption in other 
countries?  
Initially, it is well to be reminded that political regime is not an essential absolute 
element leads to corruption before introducing Chinese corruption. People will think 
of China is a non-democratic country with serious corruption. And the level of 
corruption will continue to deteriorate if without democratic development. Previous 
studies on corruption find that political regime affects corruption. This may prove the 
speculation of people to Chinese corruption. However, the relationship between 
corruption and the political regime is non-linear, i.e. democracy cannot ensure the 
clean of government. Rose-Ackerman (2001) points out that a democratic regime does 
not ensure more clean government. Adserà, Boix, and Payne (2000) believe that 
although democratic regimes have proper constitutional mechanisms to ensure 
  
politicians accountable to citizens, however, corruption and malfunctioning 
governments remain widespread phenomena. Charron and Lapuente (2010) find that 
there is a relatively clear curvilinear relationship between quality of government and 
democracy. Their literature review provides several different researches which reflects 
the relationship between quality of government and democracy. For instance, Bäck 
and Hadenius (2008) and Montinola and Jackman (2002) indicate the relationship 
between the integrity of government and democracy is non-linear. The democratic 
regime may have more corrupt government than the non-democratic system. Chang 
and Golden (2010) find that “personalistic and personalistic-hybrid regimes are more 
prone to corruption than single-party and military regimes and that rulers who expect 
to remain in power for longer are less corrupt”. Ades and Di Tella (1999)’s 
cross-country data also reveals that there is no significant correlation of corruption 
with the level of democracy. Only mature democracies are relatively free from 
corruption. (Treisman, 2000) In authoritarian regimes, precisely because of concerns 
about the legitimacy of political power, the rulers realized negative effects of 
corruption on it. They have to make strong actions on fighting corruption. Chinese 
government proves this point from the anti-corruption campaign in recent years. 
Controlling corruption is determined by the intention of China’s rulers, not dependent 
on the political regime. The determinants of corruption result from the defects and 
vulnerabilities of institutions, not from the non-democratic regime. The paper would 
not regard differently the studies in China from democratic countries by the aid of the 
understanding of the relationship between political regimes and corruption which is 
mentioned above. In addition, previous studies may explain why authoritarian regimes 
might combat corruption, but not how. The work of this paper attempts to explore 
whether authoritarian regimes can decrease the level of corruption as same as some 
democratic regimes did and how.  
 
Secondly, unique political and economic system creates distinct corruption. China is 
making a transition from centrally planned economy to capitalist semi-market 
  
economy, but political control remains centralized. (Knight, 2015) Defects and 
vulnerabilities of institutions appear gradually during the process of transition. The 
risk of corruption has a lot to do with rapid economic transition and centralization of 
power. This paper believes that perfection and development of accountability and 
supervision mechanism fall behind economic development to result in the 
deterioration of corruption in China. Knight concludes the origin of Chinese 
corruption from the view of transition: “the combination of economic decentralization 
and semi-market economic creates a problem of weak accountability and a breeding 
ground for rent seeking and corruption”. (Knight, 2015) Moreover, Most of the 
Chinese corruption occurs in state-owned enterprises and collective economies. It is 
closely related to the public economy (Nie, 2014) These two factors lead Chinese 
corruption fundamentally different from individual corruption in the western 
countries. 
 
2.3.2 What are the determinants of Chinese corruption? 
Literature review above mentioned that decentralization is one important factor which 
impacts on corrupt behavior. There are two inconsistent positions on this factor. One 
supports positive effects of decentralization on reducing corruption. Another one 
believes decentralization leads to serious corruption. The effects of decentralization 
on corruption still are debating. It is necessary to understand the background of 
decentralization, just as when investigating the causes of corruption, the backgrounds 
of different countries make the results different. It is not surprising that previous 
studies on the effects of decentralization on corruption had different results. This 
paper rethinking these discussion bases on the research which explore the relationship 
between corruption and decentralization in China. Decentralization is a good example 
to describe that how did a serious of defects and vulnerabilities of institutions that 
appear during the course of the economic and political transition deteriorate 
corruption. In other words, this paper believes decentralization is a crucial element 
leads to China’s corruption. Since the beginning of the economic reform in 1978, 
  
decentralization provides chances for the individual and the collective to corrupt due 
to autonomy in making decision without accountability. In the above, the paper 
provides scholars debates about whether corruption is a principal-agent problem or a 
collective action dilemma. The paper argues that corruption is not only a 
principal-agent problem in China but also a collective action predicament. 
Decentralization is one of the main causes of these two problems. First of all, the 
author discusses the impact of decentralization on corruption from the perspective of a 
principal-agent problem. Decentralization empowers the local government to have a 
dual agent status. Local governments are entrusted by the central government to carry 
out regional governance in accordance with the central overall plan. Meanwhile, the 
local people delegate power to the local government through the National People’s 
Congress. The reasons for the principal-agent problem are mention above:
“information asymmetry”“lack of accountability and oversight mechanisms”. These 
two factors occur in the relationship between the local government and the central 
government or local citizens. The central government delegates control of land and 
local economic development to local governments. Extensive administrative and 
economic discretion empowers the local government on “business licensing, resource 
distribution, administrative budgeting, local taxation, and trade and investment” 
aspects. (Ting Gong, 2006) Local governments and local businesses or individuals 
form a community of interests to avoid exposure to corruption while profiting. The 
central government is difficult to grasp the local governments’ preferences and 
behavior which results in information asymmetry. Citizens and local governments 
also have information asymmetry. Local governments possess information on political, 
economic, and social aspects. Even if the Regulations on Open Government 
Information of the People’s Republic of China was fully implemented. But Article 8 
provides excuses for local government to refuse to share the information with the 
public. “The government information disclosed by administrative agencies may not 
endanger state security, public security, economic security and social stability”. (Yale 
Law School, 2008) The local governments could use it to refuse to share unflattering 
  
information to the public. The agent-principal link chain is secured by effective 
supervision mechanism under ideal conditions. However, the oversight and 
accountability are limited. Power supervision requires paying the cost. The gains from 
the supervision are shared by whole society. This would undoubtedly discourage 
participation for rational people. Decentralization contributed the Party Committee 
secretary or so-called “first hand” to become the most powerful person in local 
governments. The “first hand” have “the final authority in making all the major 
decision, including personnel decision affecting their officials and implementation of 
national economic polices”. (Quah, 2014) “The central government relies only on the 
CCP’s organization and discipline and specifically the local party secretary to ensure 
control of the county and township governments”. (Quah, 2014) This leads to 
supervision mechanism failure from subordinate units. Rational officials of 
subordinate governments are not daft enough to report corruption of higher levels of 
governments at risk of losing jobs. Party organs for discipline inspection at the same 
level have common interests with the local governments. They work together to avoid 
supervision. Therefore, the supervision implemented by the same level of the Party’s 
commissions for discipline inspection is disabled. In addition, huge bureaucracy 
means that consummate oversight mechanisms require spending huge amounts of 
money, manpower, and resources on running the Party disciplinary authorities. 
Compared to the huge expenditure against corruption, the budgets of Chinese 
governments and disciplinary inspection departments are very limited. In conclusion, 
decentralization provides discretionary power and control of resources to the local 
governments. The backward oversight and accountability institutions contribute to the 
outbreak of the corruption. Meanwhile, it reveals the challenges of inner-party 
oversight. It is with these thoughts in mind that the dilemma of the central 
government on supervising the governments on local levels inspires the paper to 
explore the impact of civil power on reducing corruption. Social accountability may 
conduce to guide the central government out of trouble.  
 
  
Nowadays, the pattern of individual corruption has shifted toward collective 
corruption. Decentralization remains a crucial cause of corruption from collective 
action dilemma perspective. Tax-sharing system put a great deal of pressure on local 
governments. Most of the taxes were turned over to the central government. It 
compelled local governments and local officials to rely on creating off-budgetary 
funds to expand their financial resources for cover local expenditures. (Quah, 2014) 
As mentioned above, fiscal decentralization provides discretion and the eminent 
domain without check and balance to the officials at the local level. The extra- and 
off-budgetary revenues are not subject to oversight. Therefore, the huge economic 
interests attract local governments officials and civil servants to form holistic interests’ 
groups opposed to the central government. This leads to collective action dilemma as 
Olson argued. The larger the group, the less likely it will be for an individual in the 
group to provide an optimal level of collective goods, especially without coercive or 
external incentive. (Olson, 1965) Local governments are not precluded from 
predicting that corrupt practices will lead to the collapse of the entire bureaucracy and 
the loss of collective goods. Large interest groups result in that officials at the local 
level do not defend the legitimacy of the regime in the first place. This is because they 
can enjoy the benefits provided by the group even if they do not contribute to the 
group through rational calculation. The expansion of the autonomy of local 
governments provides power to play with the central government. The previous 
pattern of defusing and regulating the conflicts between local governments and central 
government does not seem to contribute corruption out of the dilemma of collective 
action. Non-governmental forces outside the system may be able to change this 
situation.  
 
The above explains why decentralization causes corruption in China. Beyond that, 
low probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenders also affect China’s 
corruption. Whether or not the officials choose to corrupt boils down to trade-offs. 
(Treisman, 2000) Participating in corruption is a rational decision for many officials 
  
in China due to China’s corruption has high profits and low risks. (T. Gong & Scott, 
2016; Quah, 2014; Tian, 2014) Quah (2014) provides numbers of corrupt offenders 
and numbers of these people were punished. For instance, only 9.3 percent of corrupt 
offenders were imprisoned and 0.04 percent were executed during the first corruption 
campaign from 1951 to 1952. Only 6.6 percent of corrupt officials were sentenced 
between 1993 and 1998. Pei (2007a) also prove this opinion by providing the 
statistical data. His findings reveal that only a small proportion of officials are 
punished: “the odds of a corrupt official going to jail are less than 3 out of 100”. Most 
of them only received a warning or are expelled from the CCP. Jianhong, Leling, and 
Steven F. (2001) provide three factors that explain what result in a low probability of 
detection and punishment. Initially, the officials abuse their power to search for profit 
with impunity due to lack of the public’s supervision and monitor. Secondly, the CCP 
avoid exposures of the officials’ corrupt behavior as much as possible for political 
legitimacy and social harmony. Lastly, traditional corrupt culture reduces expectations 
of the risk of being caught and punished.  
 
The reasons for the dramatic rise corruption phenomenon are various in China. The 
above provides two main factors, but that are most significant. The excessive 
concentration of power and the lack of effective checks and oversight at the local 
level may conclude the crux of the problem. The following introduces changing forms 
of corruption after the reform in 1978. Guo (2013) introduces briefly the development 
and changes in China’s corruption after economic reform since 1978 from the 
accusation of corruption perspective. He believes that the charges of corruption have 
undergone two restructuring. The first was from embezzlement to bribery. The second 
was from bribery to conflicts of interests. The most common corruption cases of 
corruption were to embezzlement by the staff of banks or financial officers of 
government in the 80s and the early 90s stage. Due to strengthened regulations on 
management of funds, this behavior rarely occurs now. Subsequently, in the market 
economy establishment initial period, there is a great room for officials to exchange 
  
interests due to lacking oversight and regulation. Corruption occurred in the form of 
bribery at that time. In the present cases of corruption crime point of view, the type of 
corruption crime concentrates in the area of conflict of interests. Guo (2013) describes 
several common forms of conflict of interests. For instance, bribers subsidize money 
to officials for supporting officials’ children to study abroad for exchanging interests. 
Or officials are promised to be hired with a high salary after retirement. Or officials 
use their power of influence to do business in relatives’ names. In addition, the 
transformation from personal corruption to collective corruption is another 
development trend in China's corruption.  
 
2.3.3 China’s network and measures against corruption 
Supervision over administration is carried out through several channels. China has 
four major Anti-Corruption Agencies. Lead one is the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI). It is the highest discipline authority under the Party 
Central Committee and its main functions are to maintain party discipline and to 
combat corruption for promoting a clean system of China Communist Party (CCP). 
(Wescott, Bowornwathana, & Jones, 2009) CCDI sent the central inspection groups to 
the major and municipalities and autonomous regions to promote in-depth 
anti-corruption struggle and to build a fine party culture and keep its clean 
organizations every year. Another agency is the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) 
which was established by the 1954 constitution. The MOS is responsible for 
maintaining an efficient, disciplined, clean and honest government. Unlike CCDI 
focuses on CCP, MOS mainly focus on managing public servants about their duty and 
discipline. (Quah, 2014) The third one is the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. It has 
specific anti-corruption and bribery sector for registering and investigating state 
functionaries’ corruption, bribery, embezzlement and other crimes. The fourth one is 
the National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB).  It is an agency under the direct 
administration of the State Council. It is a specific organization for preventing 
nationwide corruption. Its major function is to coordinate and scheme the work for 
  
anti-corruption in the national level. Meanwhile, the bureau also seeks cooperation on 
corruption prevention at the multilateral level. It provides guidance to social 
corporates and groups for preventing corruption. Moreover, it also participates in 
international cooperation on corruption. (Chinadaily, 2014) However, NCPB has no 
right to seek into the individual cases. Although, these agencies have defined the role 
in fighting against corruption. But as a senior fellow at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science in Beijing argued, “corruption is rotting the establishment of a rule of 
law”, anti-corruption laws, policies, and agencies are dysfunctional. (Quah, 2014) 
Low conviction rates for corruption cases reveal the situation of the ineffective 
implementation of more than 1200 laws, rules and directives against corruption. (Pei, 
2007b; Quah, 2014) The absence of judicial independence and operational autonomy 
of these agencies from the CCP in China are two significant reasons for explaining the 
invalidation of China’s anti-corruption laws and rules. The inefficient anti-corruption 
system will not change in the short term, despite the fact that China is reforming its 
judicial system for effective judicature. Perhaps the CCP needs to bring in 
constructive forces of Chinese civil society to remedy the defects of present political 
institutions. 
 
Anti-corruption campaign and power supervision as the public goods are provided by 
the state to society. This is a stated-centrism anti-corruption strategy. China’s present 
corruption control is dominated fundamentally by the Party and the government. No 
matter how the leaders stress their will and determination of fighting corruption or 
stress the coerciveness of anti-corruption agencies or policies, these all emphasize the 
core effects of the state on corruption. Nevertheless, it does not mean that China locks 
out of the public to participate anti-corruption movement. Instead, the government 
welcomes the public to participate. The disadvantage is that the social participation is 
state-led. There is growing evidence of Chinese central government calls for fighting 
corruption through the public. The communique issued after the fifth plenary session 
of the 18th CCDI of CCP stresses the present top task is to stop the spread of 
  
corruption. It also has called for more public participation in combating corruption. 
(XINHUANET, 2015) CCP stated clearly that it is important to broaden channels for 
the masses to participate in anti-corruption work, and strengthen collecting analyzing 
and disposing of the network information of public opinion on anti-corruption work 
and actively respond to social concerns in the communique of the fifth plenary 
meeting of 17
th
 CCDI of CCP. (CCDI, 2010) 2013-2017 Anti-corruption Plan also 
stresses to strengthen construction and management of anti-corruption network 
culture. It also advocates guiding the public to fight against corruption online. This is 
the first time the government brings network into anti-corruption work in institutional 
level. It reflects the rulers’ affirmation with fighting corruption through the network. 
(The CPC Central Committee, 2013) In fact, both of CCDI and MOS provide 
telephone and Internet reporting method for the public. From 2008 to 2012, MOS 
answered 443 thousand reporting telephone. Among them, there are 59 thousand 
accusations and delations. CCDI and MOS operate a website to enable the public to 
report their suspicions on government officials in 2013. The public can leave their 
suggestion and proposals and ask questions about corruption on the forum. In the first 
month after the launch of the website, CCDI received over 24800 reports. (The CPC 
Central Committee, 2013) 
 
3 Accountability and Transparency 
3.1 Horizontal accountability, Vertical accountability, and Societal accountability 
The concept of accountability in political science refers to a mechanism to keep 
individuals or agencies to account for their decisions and actions. Accountability is a 
process with three stages. Initially, the individuals or agencies provide information 
about their actions and decisions to supervisors. Subsequently, actors discuss the 
information with supervisors to check whether their duties and commitments are met 
or not. Lastly, it is the sanction stage. If the duties and commitments are not met, the 
actors may be punished. “The concept of accountability can be classified according to 
the type of accountability exercised and/or the person, group or institution the public 
  
official answer to”. (World Bank) There are three main accountabilities: horizontal, 
vertical, and societal accountability.  
 
UNDP provides the definition of horizontal accountability. This accountability is 
“imposed by governments internally through institutional mechanisms for oversight 
and checks and balance, and refers to the capacity of state institutions to check abuses 
by other public agencies and branches of government, or the requirement for agencies 
to report sideways” (UNDP, 2010). In corruption terms, Diamond (1999) introduces 
several institutions of accountability: the law, anti-corruption bodies, ombudsman’s 
office, public audits, the judicial system, and parliament. If governments expect a 
good performance of accountability, the information transfer process is extremely 
important. This is because that supervisor requires the fact of actors’ actions to judge 
supervisees’ performance. However, corrupt officials or agencies always attempt to 
hide the crime for escaping punishment. If the actions and decisions of actors are open 
and transparent, there is nowhere to hide the bad performance among institutions. 
Therefore, transparency is a significant factor for improving the effectiveness of 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability.  
 
Vertical accountability imposed externally on governments through election or 
informally by citizens and civil society or mass media. The election is the most 
common mechanism for the exercise of vertical accountability. (O'Donnell, 1998; 
UNDP, 2010) A free press plays an important role in the electoral process from 
corruption perspective. And both of free press and election requires to work in 
coordination with control corruption according to Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013)’s 
research: “on the one hand, without a free press, the voters do not have unbiased 
information on corruption activities by politicians and bureaucrats, therefore the 
accountability enhancing effect of democratic elections is questionable. On the other 
hand, just having a free press is also not a sufficient instrument of controlling 
corruption as people need free elections in order to punish revealed corrupt behavior.” 
  
Hence, for vertical accountability, it also requires making the information as open and 
transparent as possible. Voters and civil society all rely on the transparent information 
to ensure individuals or agencies to hold accountable for their behaviors and to 
pressure authorities to penalize violators if results and commitments are not met.  
 
“Societal accountability is a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control that rests 
on the actions of multiple arrays of citizens’ associations and movement and on the 
media, actions that aim at exposing governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues 
onto the public agenda, or activating the operation of horizontal agencies”. (Smulovitz 
& Peruzzotti, 2000) Societal accountability can be regarded as a branch of vertical 
accountability. However, it is more informal and less restricted compared with 
previous two types of accountability. Civil society organization and citizens are the 
main actors to hold the state to account. (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000) There are two 
important prerequisites for operating strong societal accountability through civil 
society. Media visibility is an essential prerequisite for operating societal 
accountability effectively. Media acts as a mechanism of social accountability. 
(Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000) The major function of the media in societal 
accountability is to provide a forum for debate to establish the following questions: 
“who should be held accountable, what they should be held accountable for and how 
they should be held accountable”. (Bonner, 2009) It benefits the civil society to keep 
the government in check. Societal accountability is unable to put pressure on the 
states without media. Nowadays, the rise of information and communication 
technology provides more approaches for civil-society led anti-corruption activities. 
The internet enables citizens to request public information from the government. 
Citizens can report corruption and express grievances on the Internet. (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013) The advent of the Internet has transformed traditional 
top-down information flow. It empowers civil society to ask for disclosure of 
information on corruption from bottom to top. It provides an effective complement to 
existing approaches for civil society to participate in corruption and to intervene in 
  
government behavior. Education can also be the key component of curbing corruption. 
Initially, bottom-up anti-corruption activities need citizens to have fundamental ability 
to know the policies of the government in order to figure out what information is 
required for oversight behavior of government. Secondly, citizens require the capacity 
to comprehend effectively the information given and then take appropriate actions. A 
stronger level of education may benefit civil society to make full use of societal 
accountability. The discussion about the effects of accountability on corruption above 
reveals the significance of information and transparency. The paper unfolds discussion 
on transparency in the following paragraph.  
 
The transparency initiatives have gain momentum since last decade. (Bauhr and 
Grimes, 2012) Although, transparency has received insufficient rigorous theoretical 
attention and therefore results in its conceptual ambiguity. (Bauhr and Grimes, 2012) 
However, at present, scholars and international organizations have confirmed the 
effectiveness of transparency on promoting accountability and governance. 
Transparency benefits to increased state or institutional responsiveness, decrease the 
level of corruption, provide spaces for citizen engagement, empowerment of local 
voices, enhancing democracy and accountability, bettering environmental 
preservation and better services delivery. (Johnsøn et al., 2012, Bauhr and Grimes, 
2012) Transparency is an essential condition for assisting some anti-corruption 
measures to achieve the goal of eliminating corruption. Grimes (2013) find that 
government transparency is required in terms of fighting corruption through societal 
accountability. Lindstedt and Naurin stress the important role of transparency in 
curbing corruption. (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2006) Kolstad and Wiig (2009) believe 
that transparency is increasingly regarded as a core to stop corruption and other 
dysfunctions. It is worth noting that scholars also believe transparency alone is 
insufficient in terms of fighting corruption. (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009, Lindstedt and 
Naurin, 2010) They think that previous research misunderstood the significance of 
transparency for corruption. Transparency is only one, albeit important, the criterion 
  
for reducing corruption effectively. It always requires working with other measures to 
fight against corruption. They believe that “Just making information available will not 
prevent corruption if such conditions for publicity and accountability as education, 
media circulation and free and fair elections are weak”(Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). 
 
For instance, Menocal et al. (2015) suggest that transparency works best when 
combined with oversight and monitoring. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) believe that 
transparency is predicted to deter corruption in part. It depends on strengthening 
public or societal accountability for citizens or citizens’ associations to monitor and 
act to control officials to account. Therefore, transparency is an assistive tool to 
endow both citizens and rulers with capacity through accountability to against 
corruption. Transparency made great efforts on fighting corruption as the paper 
mentioned above. However, these functions and advocates of transparency often take 
effect in the democratic environment. Democracy and transparency are two intimately 
connected and possibly inseparable-concepts as Tan believes. (Tan, 2014) In addition, 
there is little literature to show how transparency works in the political environment 
which lack of democracy. Tan’s paper believes that China has transparency, but works 
in different situations. “… transparency policies are driven by technocratic objectives, 
implemented under conditions of bureaucratic fragmentation, and governed within a 
system of single party rule” (Tan, 2014). The following section will provide the rise of 
accountability and transparency in China.  
 
3.2 The rise of social accountability and transparency in China 
People like to associate accountability, transparency, and clean government with 
democracy. These elements are significant for combating corruption as Grimes (2013) 
argues. Some countries are under the conditions of lacking transparency and 
accountability in non-democratic settings. Whether these authoritarian regimes have 
the capacity to combat corruption is questionable. Can China fight corruption rely on 
social accountability? Can transparency provide chances for both civil society and 
  
central government to fight corruption at the local level? 
 
Let’s start with transparency. The Chinese government has strong control on 
spreading information. Mainstream media such as television, newspapers, radio and 
press are under control of the government. The information released by these channels 
will come under extraordinary scrutiny. According to Brown (2012)’s words, 
transparency policies in China are driven by technocratic objectives. It is implemented 
under conditions of bureaucratic fragmentation and governed within a system of 
single party rule. However, it does not tell what information will be controlled by the 
government. For instance, local government and central government hold different 
attitude on open information policies. It shows the chances for developing 
transparency in China. The devolution of central power leads the local government to 
have more and more power on policy-making and fiscal spending since the great 
reform and opening in 1979. Local officials can interpret the central government’s 
policies according to their own interests. (Brown, 2012) It results in the deviation 
between the implementation of policies and actual purpose of the central government. 
Therefore, the central government desperate to obtain exact and comprehensive 
information of local governments in order to supervise them and to hold them 
accountable for society. In contrast, a local government attempt to avoid responsibility. 
This leads to two different attitudes to open exchange of information. As the paper 
mentioned above, although, the Chinese government has strictly control the release of 
information. But the central government supports the spread of information about 
officials who abuse power. (Brown, 2012) 
 
The drivers of enhancing transparency by the central government promote the 
development of transparency. It is precise because the purpose of supervising local 
officials’ power abuse benefits the paper to believe the rise of transparency in China 
and it may help to combat corruption in China. As a matter of fact, carrying out open 
government affairs has experienced a long process. Open government affairs promote 
  
gradually from bottom to top. It began from the 80s. Central government require 
village committees to open administrative system, results of administration and to be 
subject to public scrutiny. There is 24 local government stipulated to keep the public 
informed of the financial affairs. (Zhu, 2013）Central government continuously 
strengthened open government affairs in countryside basic-level organization in the 
90s. Meanwhile, the process of open government affairs shifted to township level. 
Due to the outbreak of SARS，transparent government affairs has become an 
important part of Chinese administrative reform. And open government affairs started 
to shift to information disclosure. The central government expanded work of the 
information disclosure to the city level. (Zhu, 2013）There are 28 local governments 
formulated administrative regulations and provisions. It promoted effectively work of 
information disclosure. (Zhu. 2013） In 2008, Chinese government promulgates 
“People’s Republic of China’s Government Information Disclosure 
Regulation”(GIDR). GIDR applies to all government agencies at and above the 
county level (including cities). It marks the openness of Chinese government to enter 
into the phase of rapid, normative and institutional development. It establishes 
primarily an institutional system of open government. The regulation endows Chinese 
citizens’ right to know and provides public oversight. (Liu,2015) It consists of 38 
articles spread over five chapters; General Principles, Scope of Disclosure, Methods 
of and Procedures for Disclosure, Supervision and Safeguards, and Supplementary 
Regulations. Chapter three and four of the GIDR provides clear regulations about 
responsibility and authorization of executive branch, the procedure of government 
agencies and administrative supervision. It ensures the power be exercised in the 
sunshine. Meanwhile, it strengthens social supervision. It empowered administrative 
proceedings’ rights of the public. It broadened the channels for the public to 
participate power supervision. The implementation of GIDR offers an institutional 
platform for corruption prevention and combating corruption. 
 
  
The paper comes to talk about the rise of social accountability in China. China is a 
non-democratic country according to the definition of democracy in western countries. 
Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000) indicates that “political competition, press freedom, 
and government transparency … are obviously strongly associated with democracy 
and imply that societal accountability is unlikely to be successful in an authoritarian 
setting like China”, however, this does not affect the existence of accountability in 
China. Accountability has different forms from democratic settings. For instance, 
officials in China are held accountable through the cadre responsibility system. 
(Heberer & Trappel, 2013) This is a unique accountability under China’s current 
institutional arrangements. The functions of the cadre responsibility system are as 
same as political accountability in the countries with competitive elections. The cadre 
responsibility system holds officials accountable for their mistakes. It allows the 
central government to have an accurate picture of political attitudes and ideological 
stands of its bureaucratic organization at the local level. (Chen, 1999) In addition, a 
petition system can be considered as another accountability. Under this system, 
aggrieved people may expose cases of unlawful behavior to petition offices. (Chen, 
1999) In terms of fighting corruption, this mechanism seems work quite well. (Chen, 
1999) However, there is a flaw of petition system in China as Chen (1999) argues: 
“ petition office could, and other does, return the complaint to the bureau against 
which the complaint was field”. Consequently, it frequently led to reprisals against the 
complainants”. Local governments often step forward and stop legitimate petitioning 
activities for exposing the governments’ dereliction of duty to central government.   
 
As stated above accountability exists in China but in different forms. Accountability 
has played an increasingly important role since the economic reform and openness. 
The changes in state and economy encroach social autonomy. The situation of abuse 
of power was rampant due to lack of election competition and weak checks on the 
government in the 80s and 90s. Invasion of citizenship rights and corruption was 
especially prevalent at that time. The Central government has to constrain the power 
  
of the officials. Traditional accountability mechanism such as party discipline and 
ideological inculcation shifted to new forms of accountability. (Ma, 2012) Horizontal 
accountability started to emerge. The People’s Congress legislature strengthened its 
supervision over the government in lawmaking and budgeting. Top-down bureaucratic 
accountability also has been refined. (Ma, 2012) However, lacking citizens’ 
participation still cannot ensure the officials were accountable to society. Moreover, 
due to the wealthy and the powerful are allied. It leads the society to protect itself 
relying on individual citizens, social groups, and the media to constrain the misuses of 
power by the officials. (Ma, 2012) Increasing economic freedom and education level 
provide capacity for Chinese individuals to supervise the government and to fight for 
their rights and interests. (Ma, 2012) This may be the motivation and stimulation of 
rising of societal accountability in China.  
 
Civil society as the main force of societal accountability, its status of development 
determines the development of societal accountability under present Chinese political 
context. It is often said China does not have a civil society, or current center of the 
debate is whether civil society exists or not in China. Dickson (2016)’s understanding 
of the realms of civil society includes two dimensions. Civil society organization is 
labeled as non-critical or critical ones. Dickson (2016) points out that “if civil society 
refers to autonomous groups that are critical of political leaders and their policies, and 
even opposed to the regime”, then the opinions think China does not have a civil 
society which is largely true. It means critical civil society organizations are 
nonexistent in current political context, at least in legal conditions. However, the 
concept of civil society includes other aspects. “If the notion of civil society is 
expanded to include the kinds of groups that make up civil society in democratic 
regimes-neighborhood groups, social organization, philanthropic and faith-based 
organization, etc.-then civil society is blooming” (Dickson, 2016) Even though, these 
organizations are non-critical which do not form to criticize the government and only 
focus on the economic and cultural interests of their members. But these non-critical 
  
groups are seen as the key to democratic politics due to they “produce organizational 
and communication skills, norms of participation, interpersonal trust, and ultimately 
improved governance” (Dickson, 2016). In fact, these social-serviced civil society 
organizations and civil society are changing gradually. Present Chinese civil society 
has following characteristics according to Li (2011) ’s paper: 1.  Although, the 
degree of organization of society is low, but freedom of association has been made. 2. 
Society can organize some immature but occasionally effective social movement and 
achieve a social purpose. 3. Society can express critical comments to the government. 
In what ways can social organizations express their comments to the government? Or 
how does social accountability work in China? 
 
In general, there are two major forms of social accountability in China. One is 
state-led societal accountability. Another one is society-led societal accountability. 
Public hearing is one of the most typical and important state-led societal 
accountability. China has established a procedure for public hearing in 1996. This is 
followed by many related legislations during last decade. (Ma, 2012) However, those 
hearings have great limitation. Whether citizens’ participation has an influence on 
policymaking is doubtful. The public hearing grew up as a form of social 
accountability since Xiamen (Chinese coastal cities) Paraxylene Project in 2007. 
Xiamen Paraxylene Project is the first time the government listened to views of 
citizens in hearing after the intense conflict between citizens and government. It 
represents a shift of administrative decision-making. Over the next few years, public 
hearings for different purposes were held in different cities. Despite these public 
hearings benefit the government to communicate with the public to solve the conflicts. 
This form of social accountability is still weak due to the process of selecting 
participants is controlled by the government. (Ma, 2012) Second forms of state-led 
social accountability are democratic administration. Some cities practice public 
involvement to evaluate government performance by surveys. Public involvement 
forces the government to provide feedback to needs of the public. It not only benefits 
  
the public to supervise whether the government fulfill their commitments, but also 
provide chances to participate in policymaking. It is a form of developing democracy 
construction in China. The third one is Online Governance. Nowadays, increasing 
numbers of governmental department utilize the Internet as communicating 
instrument with citizens. Most of the website of departments operated “Secretary 
Mailbox”. People can submit their opinions or questions to the secretary. They can get 
feedback in a very short time. The public is increasingly turning to social media to 
supervise on public servants and to bring down the high-level officials. This is 
society-led accountability. New media Chinese Twitter “Weibo” played a significant 
role. Increasing numbers of corruption of street-level bureaucracies and high-level 
officials are exposed on social media by the public. These exposures are concerned by 
nationwide netizens. Under the nationwide social pressure, these officials are 
investigated and sentenced quickly. However, the attention on these incidents fades 
away as quickly as they are concerned. Netizens did not follow the entire process of 
the sentence. And this social supervision lacks institutionalization, whether these 
officials have been punished accordingly is not transparent. Another form of 
society-led social accountability is a demonstration. There are many cases to present 
how the public protests their own interests through demonstrations. These “walk” are 
organized by grass root groups. They utilize silence and peaceful protest to express 
their requirement and dissatisfactory. However, the government always takes 
demonstrations without a declaration as illegal behavior. In fact, there are few 
demonstrations to be approved in China. The organizers were arrested by authority. 
Utilizing demonstrations to present demands are limited by the government. 
 
Civil society organization supervises government through the methods mentioned 
above. The process of oversight and accountability always challenged by the 
government. Central government or local government showed control-oriented and 
limit-oriented attitude on managing civil society organization for maintaining political 
stability. Although the numbers of civil society organization are increasing year by 
  
year, these numbers only reflect how many organizations registered with Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. And there are lots of organizations cannot make themselves to become 
“legal” organizations due to strict requirements for registration. Only those 
organizations called “government-organized nongovernmental organizations” which 
have common interests with the government are allowed to plan activities. Therefore, 
the numbers of civil society organization which provided by official statistics can only 
reflect the rough scale of social organization in China.  
 
Despite the strict control on social organization development in the big picture, not all 
government agencies reject social organization with critical opinion due to the 
difference between goals of the central and local leadership or the difference between 
missions of government agencies. For instance, the operation of environmental NGOs 
is a good example to show the different attitude between the central government and 
local government to NGOs. Central government advocates the provincial government 
to develop a green economy. Local NGOs stand in a better position to monitor local 
government than central government due to the limitation of labor power of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection. The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
favors the growth of environmental NGOs. The operation of environmental NGOs 
helps the central leadership to monitor the behavior of the local government in order 
to ensure their actions do not de-legitimate the regime. (Dickson, 2016) However, in 
China, economic growth dominates local government performance evaluation. Local 
leaders often regard these organizations as obstacles to achieving their goal of 
economic growth and then influence their performance evaluation. (Dickson, 2016) 
Therefore, not surprisingly, local and central governments have different attitudes on 
the development of environmental NGOs. Likewise, activities in the field of fighting 
corruption can gain support from central government or relative anti-corruption 
agencies. Hence, anti-corruption activities which are carried out by civil society may 
be allowed even if local governments have strong control on civil society. In addition, 
present researches do not provide information about how much and in which methods 
  
civil society could contribute to combating corruption in present political context. The 
paper attempts to comprehend these aspects. 
 
In summary, the paper introduces the development of accountability and transparency 
in China. China has accountability as same as democratic regimes and it is effective 
oversight of the behavior of officials to ensure that they do not abuse their power. The 
cadre responsibility system is main horizontal accountability in China. Moreover, the 
paper introduces the development of social accountability in China. Allied the 
powerful and the rich results in Chinese society has to protect itself. Social 
accountability emerged in this background. Increasing economic freedom and level of 
education provide capabilities for the public to develop civil society. More and more 
individual citizens and social organization enhance social oversight capability to 
supervise whether their rights are stolen away by the officials. Although the Chinese 
government has strict control on the activities of civil society. But this does not 
influence the positive effects of civil society on corruption. This is due to the central 
government always support citizens’ participation on fighting corruption. State builds 
actively channels for citizens to receive and report information of corruption. There is 
no evidence to show that Chinese citizens are threatened when they participate in 
anti-corruption activities. Likewise, the level of transparency is increasing in China, at 
least in terms of transparency on corruption. China exercises strict regulatory control 
on information dissemination. However, as the paper mentioned above, the central 
government requires the citizens’ participation on supervising the local government. 
Hence, the information disclosure of corruption and civil society-led anti-corruption 
activities seems acquiescent for now. 
 
4 Hypotheses  
There have been studies showing that authoritarian regimes can combat corruption. 
However, how the authoritarian regimes combat corruption has been little investigated. 
The rise of societal accountability and transparency provides a chance to research the 
  
relationship between corruption and societal accountability in China. The main 
research question is: Does societal accountability benefits Chinese government to 
reduce corruption, if so, how? Moreover, the paper, in the light of previous related 
literature， finds that the degree of government transparency, people’s level of 
education and Internet penetration not only affect directly to the level of corruption, 
but may also spur corruption indirectly through promoting the development of civil 
society. Therefore, investigating these three factors and their interactions with a 
density of civil society may benefit the paper to understand the effects of societal 
accountability on corruption under the influence of these conditions. The broad 
research question is extended to the following questions. 
1. Will the level of transparency of the provincial and municipal governments affect 
the role of civil society in the fight against corruption? 
2. Will the education level of the public affect the role of civil society in the fight 
against corruption? 
3. Will the Internet penetration of residents affect the role of civil society in the fight 
against corruption? 
4. Is it possible for civil society to play an anti-corruption role only in areas with a 
high degree of transparency? 
5. Is it possible for civil society to play an anti-corruption role only in areas with a 
high degree of education? 
6. Is it possible for civil society to play an anti-corruption role only in areas with a 
high degree of Internet penetration?  
 
Following hypotheses are based on the research questions above. 
1. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of people in all the provinces have same schooling years in 
the absence of other factors. 
2. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of all the local governments have same level of 
  
transparency in the absence of other factors. 
3. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of all the provinces have same level of Internet penetration 
in the absence of other factors.  
4. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of a government with a higher degree of transparency.  
5. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of people with longer schooling years. 
6. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of a province with higher Internet penetration. 
7. The transparency of the government and the degree of corruption is negatively 
related only when a province has a high density of civil society. 
8. The level of education and the degree of corruption is negatively related only 
when a province has a high density of civil society. 
9. The level of Internet penetration and the degree of corruption is negatively related 
only when a province has a high density of civil society. 
 
5 Data and Model Specification   
This paper employs secondary data for statistical analysis base on ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS). The following section introduces the data and model 
applied in this analyses. It involves sources of the data, reasons for applying them in 
analyses and advantages and weakness. The determinant of corruption, the concept of 
societal accountability mentioned above is the main foundation for selecting data. 
 
5.1 Dependent Variable: Measurement of level of corruption  
Initially, the author introduces dependent variables. Due to the purpose of this 
research is to explore the effect of rising societal accountability on the level of 
corruption in provincial level in China. Hence, the dependent variable in this paper 
indicates the level of corruption in the local level. The concept of corruption is 
  
controversial and varied. There are many ways to measure corruption. According to 
the previous literature about corruption, measuring methods can be split into two 
categories: objective and subjective measurement. Objective measurement mainly 
relies on statistical information of corruption cases from disciplinary or judicial 
organs. Subjective measurement mainly depends on investigating people’s subjective 
assessment to the level of corruption. This paper focuses on the corruption at the 
sub-national level. But the subjective measurement seems blank at the sub-national 
level. In addition, Zhou and Tao (2009) argue that the advantage of objective 
measurements of corruption can reduce the deviation of quantitative analysis due to 
the consistency of internal political institution and legal structure, relatively smaller 
gap of social, economic and cultural development and relatively less unobservable 
elements. Therefore, the paper utilizes objective measurement of corruption. Most of 
the Chinese scholars agree to use the numbers of filed and investigated officials by 
region or number of annual registered cases on corruption in the procurator’s office by 
region to reflect the situation of corruption in the regional level. (Dong & Torgler, 
2013; Fan, 2013; Wu, 2008; Zhou & Tao, 2009) Their data sets are derived from 
China Procuratorial Yearbooks. The numbers of filed and investigated officials or the 
numbers of annual registered cases of corruption are always divided by the 
populations or the numbers of civil servants of every province in order to eliminate 
size effect. The results present the situation of corruption in the regional level. 
However, there are many scholars questioned these data. The numbers can also 
indicate the anti-corruption efforts rather than the level of corruption. (Zhang, Gao, Fu, 
& Zhang, 2007) Nie (2014) believe that these data reflect the level of corruption and 
he provides his explanation. The numbers of annual registered cases or people on 
corruption should have a positive relationship with the expenditure on fighting 
corruption of Public Security Bureau, Procuratorate and Court if the numbers indicate 
the efforts of combating corruption. Nevertheless, the relationship is negative. 
Therefore, the paper believes the Nie’s opinion.  
 
  
Person of Cases Registered under Direct Investigation by People's Procuratorate, Occupational 
Crimes (Persons) 
Beijing 505 Shanghai 486 Hubei 2897 
Tianjin 397 Jiangsu 2110 Hunan 1794 
Hebei 3030 Zhejiang 2065 Guangdong 3443 
Shanxi 1991 Anhui 2219 Guangxi 1819 
Inner Mongolia 1619 Fujian 1567 Hainan 354 
Liaoning 2568 Jiangxi 1712 Chongqing 906 
Jilin 2433 Shandong 3563 Sichuan 2457 
Heilongjiang 2777 Henan 4523 Guizhou 1295 
Yunnan 1688 Shannxi 1702 Gansu 1241 
Qinghai 251 Ningxia 430   
 
The paper collects the numbers of filed and investigated officials and to divide the 
numbers of the population between the same year and same province to get the values 
of the rate of corruption. The data comes from Procuratorial Yearbook of China and 
Work Reports of Provincial Procuratorates. Mainland China contains 22 provinces, 4 
municipalities, 5 autonomous regions. The actual research objects are 28 in analyses 
due to some provinces did not provide data. Following table provides the person of 
cases registered under direct investigation by People’s Procuratorate due to 
occupational crimes. Occupational crimes include the crimes of corruption bribes and 
the crimes of dereliction of duty.Moreover, there is one advantage of using the data 
above as measurement for corruption. The statistic of the Supreme people’s 
Procuratorate shown that 70 to 80% of clues for investigating corruption crimes came 
from the populous. (CRI Online, 2008; News of the Communist Party of China, 2008; 
SOHU, 2014) This benefits the paper to believe the effect of civil society on fighting 
corruption. In addition, the paper applies averaged rate of corruption between 2003 
and 2007 as control variable. It benefits to provide a more robust examination of the 
issue of causality and to provide an estimate of the effect of the independent variables 
  
on changes in levels of corruption. (Grimes, 2013)  
 
5.2 Density of Civil Society  
The density of civil society organization density is measured as the number of social 
organizations and groups per 10000 inhabitants. Data on social organizations and 
groups derives from National Bureau of statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
(NBS) There are many indicators can be regarded as civil society organization in 
statistics of NBS. There are three kinds of civil organizations according to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of China. Martins provides a brief introduction to these three 
kinds of civil organization: “1) Social associations (shehui tuanti), which are 
non-profit and voluntary, constituted by Chinese citizens and from four types 
including academic groups, commercial and industrial organizations, professional 
organizations and federations; 2) Private non-commercial entities (minban feiqiye 
danwei), which are social organizations without state financing and are organized by 
companies, institutions, social forces or individual citizens with social non-profit 
objectives; 3) Foundations (jijinhui), which are legally constituted and non-profit, 
dedicated to common good” (Martins, 2014). Therefore, this paper utilizes the 
indicator: Number of Enterprises of Social Organization (Unit) in 2011 as the main 
data for measuring the density of civil society in China in 2011. It reflects the sum of 
the three kinds of civil organizations above. It is important to note that the most 
studies about Chinese civil societies reflect the fact that actual numbers of groups of 
civil society are far more than the numbers in the official statistics. However, it is 
impossible to know the correct amount. Therefore, the paper can only utilize the 
official estimates for analyzing. To emphasize another important point, the paper does 
not choose the social organizations which mainly focus on fighting corruption due to 
no clear explanation of the structure of the data by official statistics. Moreover, there 
is little data to show how many special anti-corruption social organizations or groups 
in China. No academic studies in China provide relevant data. In addition, Grimes 
(2012) explains that organizations support social accountability can be any kinds of 
  
organizations if the organizations seeking to secure entitlement for their community or 
for marginalized communities. Therefore, this paper does not apply numbers of 
anti-corruption social groups or organizations as a measurement of civil society. The 
table blow presents the number of enterprises of social organization. 
 
Number of Every 10000 People have Enterprises of Social Organization (Units) in 2011 
Beijing 3.76 Shanghai  4.42 Hubei  4.05 
Tianjin 3.09 Jiangsu  4.64 Hunan  2.59 
Hebei 2.19 Zhejiang  5.39 Guangdong  2.92 
Shanxi 2.96 Anhui  2.83 Guangxi  2.88 
Inner Mongolia 3.55 Fujian  4.57 Hainan  3.66 
Liaoning 4.29 Jiangxi  2.53 Chongqing  3.48 
Jilin 3.14 Shandong  4.27 Sichuan  3.76 
Heilongjiang 3.39 Henan  2.14 Guizhou  2.06 
Yunnan 2.92 Shannxi  4.05 Gansu  3.89 
Qinghai 4.75 Ningxia  6.71    
 
 
5.3 Transparency 
The paper utilizes Information Disclosure Index in the provincial government website 
performance evaluation in 2010 for measuring the level of transparency in different 
provinces. The evaluation is commissioned by Chinese Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology and carried out by China Software Testing Center. The first 
assessment commenced in 2002. Main evaluation objects are official websites of 
central ministries or departments, provincial governments, and sub-provincial cities. 
The main purpose of the assessment aims to lead the government to expand and 
strengthen the depth and width of information sharing. It also aims at promoting the 
ability to handle affairs and the ability to service the requirements of the publics. The 
assessment evaluates 10 fields, such as education, employment, healthcare, and 
  
housing, etc. The details and contents of the assessment may adjust each year 
accordingly. The evaluation of Information Disclosure in 2010 focuses on the hot 
issues of common concern. These hot issues concern situations of the appointment 
and removal, recruiting civil servant, disclosure of financial information (financial 
budget, administrative charge and government procurement), key construction project, 
policies and regulations and normative documents, government planning, the 
government executive meeting, etc. The score of this indicator depends on whether 
the government will fully disclose the above information to the public. Although the 
paper cannot determine if the results of the evaluation reflect accurately the level of 
transparency. But the paper believes the results show the gaps across provinces in the 
transparency area at least. The scores are between 0 and 1. Greater scores indicate 
higher transparency. Following table shows the transparency scores for each province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Score of Information Disclosure Index for each Province 
Beijing 0.80 Shanghai 0.78 Hubei 0.52 
Tianjin 0.58 Jiangsu 0.57 Hunan 0.70 
Hebei 0.60 Zhejiang 0.59 Guangdong 0.83 
Shanxi 0.48 Anhui 0.49 Guangxi 0.33 
Inner Mongolia 0.30 Fujian 0.58 Hainan 0.68 
Liaoning 0.51 Jiangxi 0.57 Chongqing 0.43 
Jilin 0.39 Shandong 0.26 Sichuan 0.84 
Heilongjiang 0.65 Henan 0.42 Guizhou 0.37 
Yunnan 0.44 Shannxi 0.79 Gansu 0.25 
Qinghai 0.34 Ningxia 0.32   
  
 
5.4 Education 
Education is an important variable for researching corruption. As the paper mentioned 
above, education is one significant condition for strengthening the capacity of civil 
society to fight corruption. In addition, in general speaking, in most all studies of the 
determinants of corruption at both national or sub-national level have shown that 
better-educated countries or regions lead to lower levels of corruption. (Charron, 2009; 
Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Treisman, 2000) The education in this paper is indicated 
by average schooling years. The paper collects numbers of the population in a 
different level of education for each province in 2011: illiteracy (0 years), primary 
school (6 years), junior high school (3 years), senior high school (3 years) and 
post-secondary school (12 years). Then the author calculates a number of schooling 
years for the people in each province. Lastly, the results divided by the populations to 
get the value of average schooling years. Following table shows the detailed 
information. 
 
 
 
 
Number of Average Schooling Years 
Beijing 11.45 Shanghai 10.56 Hubei 9.37 
Tianjin 9.89 Jiangsu 9.44 Hunan 8.95 
Hebei 8.83 Zhejiang 9.05 Guangdong 9.61 
Shanxi 9.42 Anhui 8.49 Guangxi 8.75 
Inner Mongolia 9.47 Fujian 9.08 Hainan 9.00 
Liaoning 9.73 Jiangxi 8.89 Chongqing 8.91 
Jilin 9.38 Shandong 8.86 Sichuan 8.44 
Heilongjiang 9.41 Henan 8.98 Guizhou 7.73 
Yunnan 7.91 Shannxi 9.31 Gansu 8.45 
  
Qinghai 7.88 Ningxia 8.52   
 
5.5 Internet Penetration 
The Internet has great effects on improving the capacity of civil society for curbing 
corruption as the discussion mentioned in the beginning of the paper. In addition, 
there are plenty of evidence to show the positive effects of Internet and information 
technology on reducing corruption in a certain country or around the world. Lio, Liu, 
and Ou (2011) use a panel consisting of 70 countries covering the period from 1998 to 
2005 to attempts to estimate the effects of Internet adoption on reducing corruption. 
Their discoveries recommend that the Internet has demonstrated a capacity for 
reducing corruption, however, its potential has not been fully demonstrated. Andersen, 
Bentzen, Dalgaard, and Selaya (2011) believe the development of the Internet has 
served to decrease the degree of corruption across both U.S. state and the world. 
Garcia-Murillo (2010) studies a cross section of 170 countries to estimate the effects 
of Internet access on the level of government corruption. The result indicates that the 
Internet is having a positive effect on reducing corruption around the world. Bertot, 
Jaeger, and Grimes (2010) suggest that information technology and social media 
create an atmosphere of openness for stemming corrupt behavior. These research 
believe the Internet has tremendous potentials for reducing corruption and fighting 
corruption cannot rely on its own. The Internet needs to be combined with other 
anti-corruption mechanisms to fight corruption effectively.  
 
This paper utilizes Internet penetration as the indicator of “Internet variable”. Internet 
penetration is derived from the proportion of the population using the Internet in the 
provinces, i.e., the number of people using the Internet divided by the population. 
Data were collected at the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Following table provides the data used in this paper. 
 
Internet Penetration 
  
Beijing 0.68 Shanghai 0.65 Hubei 0.37 
Tianjin 0.53 Jiangsu 0.47 Hunan 0.29 
Hebei 0.36 Zhejiang 0.56 Guangdong 0.60 
Shanxi 0.39 Anhui 0.27 Guangxi 0.29 
Inner Mongolia 0.34 Fujian 0.57 Hainan 0.39 
Liaoning 0.48 Jiangxi 0.24 Chongqing 0.37 
Jilin 0.35 Shandong 0.38 Sichuan 0.28 
Heilongjiang 0.31 Henan 0.28 Guizhou 0.24 
Yunnan 0.25 Shannxi 0.38 Gansu 0.27 
Qinghai 0.37 Ningxia 0.32   
 
5.5 Model Specification 
Following sets of regression equations are the models for analyses in this paper for 
answering research questions. 
Set 1: This set of equations shows basic multivariate models.  
1. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Educationi + α4Interneti 
2. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Educationi + α4Interneti + 
α5Ave.Corruptioni 
 
Set 2: This set of regression equations presents factors will be employed in the 
analysis. “Low Transparency”, “Low Internet” and “Low Education” are 
dichotomized and recoded variables. Education is dichotomous and coded as one 
equals the average schooling years is lower than average level. It can be regarded as 
lower education. Transparency is dichotomized and coded as the same pattern as 
Education. Zero equals the level of transparency is higher than average level. One in 
Low Internet variable indicates a lower level of Internet penetration than average level. 
The regressions attempt to present the relationship between one conditional variable, 
interaction variable and dependent variable (see specification equation 1,3,5) and with 
control variable (see specification equation 2,4,6). The results of these regressions 
may reveal the effects of CSOs density on the level of corruption in different 
  
conditions. In other words, these regressions may show that how different level of 
education, transparency and Internet openness can contribute civil society to reduce 
the level of corruption. The text in parentheses explains the hypotheses that each 
equation may examine. 
 
1. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2LowTransparencyi + α3 Low Transparencyi * CSOsi 
2. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2LowTransparencyi + α3 Low Transparencyi * CSOsi + 
α4Ave.Corruptioni (The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of a government with higher degree of transparency.) 
3. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2LowTransparencyi + α3 LowEducationi * CSOsi  
4. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2LowTransparencyi + α3 LowEducationi * CSOsi + 
α4Ave.Corruptioni (The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of 
corruption in the case of people with longer schooling years.) 
5. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2 LowInterneti * CSOsi + α3LowInterneti 
6. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1CSOsi + α2 LowInterneti * CSOsi + α3LowInterneti + α4Ave.Corruptioni 
(The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of corruption in the case 
of a province with higher Internet penetration.) 
Set 3: This set of equations has a similar pattern as set 2. But the only density of civil 
society is dichotomized. One indicates that the density of civil society is greater than 
average level of civil society density. This set of regression equations may benefit the 
paper to examines the effects of density of civil society from another perspective. It 
reveals the performance of these conditions on anti-corruption independently in active 
or inactive civil society.  
1. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Transparencyi * High CSOsi 
2. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Transparencyi * High CSOsi + + 
α4Ave.Corruptioni (The transparency of the government and the degree of corruption is negatively 
related only when a province has a high density of civil society.) 
  
3. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2 Educationi * HighCSOsi + α3Educationi 
4. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Educationi * HighCSOsi + α3Educationi + 
α4Ave.Corruptioni  (The level of education and the degree of corruption is negatively related only 
when a province has a high density of civil society.) 
5. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Interneti * HighCSOsi + α3Interneti 
6. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Interneti * HighCSOsi + α3Interneti + α4Ave.Corruptioni  
(The level of Internet penetration and the degree of corruption is negatively related only when a 
province has a high density of civil society.) 
The fourth set of equations based on the set 3. The models include all the factors that 
may affect both levels of corruption and the dynamic of civil society. These models 
may reveal the how one certain factor can contribute civil society to change the levels 
of corruption under the influences of other factors which can also influence levels of 
corruption and strength of civil society. 
1. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Transparencyi * High CSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi  
2. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Transparencyi * High CSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni 
3. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Educationi * High CSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi 
4. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Educationi * High CSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni 
5. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Interneti * High CSOsi + α4Interneti + 
α5Educationi 
6. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Interneti * HighCSOsi + α4Interneti + 
α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni 
  
7. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Transparencyi * HighCSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni + α7InGDPi 
8. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Educationi * High CSOsi + 
α4Interneti + α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni + α7InGDPi 
9. Corruption2014i= α0 + α1HighCSOsi + α2Transparencyi + α3Interneti * HighCSOsi + α4Interneti + 
α5Educationi + α6Ave.Corruptioni + α7InGDPi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Analysis and Result 
Previous research find empirical evidence to explain why authoritarian regimes can 
combat corruption as democratic regimes do, and the research show the non-linear 
relationship between corruption and democracy, but the research do not show how the 
authoritarian regimes curb corruption. Existing research has shown the effectiveness 
of societal accountability to ensure officials hold accountable for their behavior in 
democratic regimes. This analysis attempts to explore whether societal accountability 
impact on the anti-corruption campaign in authoritarian regimes. Due to the rise of 
societal accountability and transparency in China, therefore, it is interesting to explore 
how societal accountability and transparency affect anti-corruption activities in the 
context of Chinese political regimes. It is necessary to emphasize that even though 
China is regarded as a non-democratic country, but this does not mean this country is 
  
without societal accountability and conditions for curbing corruption. As the paper 
mentioned above, Chinese central government supports to enhance societal 
accountability and to encourage the sub-national government to disclose information 
to the public. This is significant to maintain legitimacy and rationality of power. This 
paper takes advantage of the rise of societal accountability and all other components 
which facilitate societal accountability to improve the quality of government and 
investigates if societal accountability has had an effect on curbing corruption among 
the sub-national governments with different conditions. 
 
The analyses are based on the model specifications above. The models in Table 1, 2, 3 
and 4 correspond to the equations in set 1, 2, 3, and 4. Initially, the paper presents two 
multivariate models in Table 1. One includes all the main effects but without the 
average of level of corruption between 2003 and 2007. The other model contains this 
variable. Subsequently, the analyses consider examining how different level of 
education, transparency and Internet openness can contribute civil society to reduce 
the level of corruption. Table 2 includes six models. The models examine the 
interaction effects between the civil society density and one certain contextual 
condition on levels of corruption. Model 1, 3, 5 does not include the previous levels of 
corruption as a control variable. Table 3 shows the models that examine the impact of 
these conditions on anti-corruption in the absence of civil society or in a dynamic civil 
society context. Model 1,3, 5 does not include the average levels of corruption 
between 2003 and 2007 as same as in Table 2. Table 4 present the estimated effects of 
varying density of civil society on levels of corruption under conditions of 
transparency, education, and Internet penetration respectively.  
 
Table 1. 1 Multivariate Models 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -.322 (.439) -.376 (.386) 
Early Corruption  .572 (.202) 
*** 
  
CSOs Density .043 (.029) .057 (.026) 
** 
Transparency -.311 (.178) 
* -.237 (.159) 
Education .120 (.056) 
** 
.093 (.050) 
* 
Internet -.875 (.377) 
** 
-.808 (.332) 
** 
N 
R
2
adj 
29 
.238 
29 
.411 
In this multivariate model, the density of civil society shows no systematic 
relationship with the dependent variable. However, it shows a systematic relationship 
with the dependent variable when the average rate of corruption crime between 2003 
and 2007 is entered the regression. The effects of Transparency and Education and 
Internet Penetration are systematic to show statistical significance. Transparency and 
Internet have a negative relationship with corruption even including control variable. 
The effects of them on corruption are slightly weakened when including the incidence 
of early corruption as a control variable. In addition, the effects of density of civil 
society are weaker than all three explanatory factors in two regressions. And the 
effects are too weak to show the relationship with corruption in general. Therefore, 
the paper attempts to provides more regression analyses to show the relationships to 
answer research questions. The models below examines individual contribution of 
CSO variable to variation in corruption level. Unfortunately, CSOs variables have 
positive effect on dependent variable in all the models. All of three hypotheses are 
rejected: “ 1. The degree of dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the 
degree of corruption in the case of people in all the provinces have same schooling 
years in the absence of other factors. 2. The degree of dynamism of civil society is 
negatively related to the degree of corruption in the case of all the local governments 
have same level of transparency in the absence of other factors. 3. The degree of 
dynamism of civil society is negatively related to the degree of corruption in the case 
of all the provinces have same level of Internet penetration in the absence of other 
factors”. 
 
  
Table 1.2 The estimated effects of civil society density on level of corruption 
Independent Variables  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Constant 
 .577 
(.367) 
.397 
(.326) 
.577*** 
(.134) 
.299* 
(.152) 
.483*** 
(.115) 
.206 
(.130) 
 
Early Corruption 
 .694*** 
(.230) 
 .614*** 
(.212) 
 .676*** 
(.207) 
 
CSO 
.018 
(.029) 
.036 
(.026) 
.012 
(.027) 
.028 
(.024) 
.040 
(.029) 
.057** 
(.025) 
 
Transparency 
  -.369** 
(.156) 
-.327** 
(.139) 
  
 
Education 
-.024 
(.040) 
-.036 
(.035) 
    
 
Internet 
    -.519** 
(.239) 
-.530** 
(.204) 
 
N 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
R
2
adj 
 
-.050 
 
.199 
 
.124 
 
.317 
 
.100 
 
.343 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Standard error within parentheses. 
 
The models in Table 2 examines how societal accountability might affect corruption 
when three conditions are weaker or absent in different provinces. The analyses 
employ three interaction variables including 29 provinces. All the conditional 
variables are dichotomized as two level, high and low as the paper mentioned above. 
Education is dichotomized and coded as zero equals the higher level of education. 
Transparency is dichotomized and coded as same as education. Zero equals the better 
level of transparency. Zero in the Internet indicates higher Internet penetration. The 
first model explores the relationship between density of civil society, transparency, 
and the interaction of these two terms on the level of corruption. Although the result 
indicates that the effect of CSOs in provinces with a high level of transparency on 
corruption is -.005. However, the effect of CSOs on corruption become positive when 
the previous level of corruption is controlled for, as the effect of civil society is .012. 
Therefore, the hypothesis: "The degrees of the dynamism of civil society is negatively 
related to the degree of corruption in the case of a government with a higher degree of 
  
transparency" does not get support in this model. The third model explores the 
relationship between CSOs density, education, and their interaction term on the level 
of corruption. The main effect of CSOs density on corruption in provinces with a low 
level of education is .035, in provinces with a high level of education is -.122. The 
fourth model reflects the same result as the third model. Vibrant civil society decrease 
the level of corruption in the provinces with a high level of education, despite the 
correlation is weaker (b=-.037). Therefore, the hypothesis: "The degree of dynamism 
of civil society is negatively related to the degree of corruption in the case of people 
with longer schooling years" can be supported. Model 5 and 6 explores the 
relationship between CSOs density, Internet penetration and their interaction term on 
the level of corruption. Civil society density has no correlation with the level of 
corruption when the provinces with a high level of Internet penetration. The effect of 
CSOs density in provinces with a low level of Internet penetration is positive (.043). 
The effect of CSOs density on corruption are positive when the levels of corruption in 
earlier period controlled for in the provinces with the high or low level of Internet 
penetration (b=.061 or b=.52). Therefore, the hypotheses: "The degree of dynamism of 
civil society is negatively related to the degree of corruption in the case of a province 
with higher Internet penetration" does not get support.  
Table 2 The estimated effect of civil society density on corruption under one certain condition 
(OLS) 
Independent Variables  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Constant 
.373
*** 
(.099)
 
.138 
(.127) 
.919
*** 
(.278) 
.425 
(.378) 
.400 
(.249) 
-.130 
(.258) 
 
Early Corruption 
 .569** 
(.219) 
 .510* 
(.278)
 
 .761
*** 
(.220) 
 
CSO 
-.005 
(.028) 
.012 
(.026) 
-.122 
(.075) 
-.037 
(.085) 
-.008 
(.061) 
.061 
(.055) 
 
Low Transparency 
-.063 
(.079) 
-.025 
(.073) 
    
 
CSO * Low Transparency 
.046** 
(.0188) 
.036** 
(.016) 
    
 
Low Education 
  -.649
** 
(.299) 
-.319 
(.338) 
  
  
 
CSO * Low Education 
  .157* 
(.080) 
.075 
(.089) 
  
 
Low Internet 
    -.083 
(.275) 
.174 
(.241) 
 
CSO * Low Internet 
    .051 
(.070) 
-.009 
(.061) 
 
N 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
R2adj 
 
.152 
 
.310 
 
.092 
 
.171 
 
.041 
 
.333 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Standard error within parentheses. Low Education is dichotomous and 
coded as zero equals longer schooling years. Low Transparency is dichotomous as zero equals to a 
better level of transparency. Low Internet is dichotomous and coded as zero equals to high Internet 
penetration. 
 
The third set of analyses has a similar pattern as set 2, but the only density of civil 
society is dichotomized. One equals to a high level of civil society density. These 
analyses benefit the paper to explore how the vitality of civil society assists these 
three conditional factors associated with anti-corruption to combat corruption. First 
and second models investigate the effect of CSOs density, transparency, and the 
interaction term of these two variables on the level of corruption with or without the 
level of corruption between 2003 and 2007 as a control variable. The effects of 
interaction term are positive. And their absolute values are smaller than the absolute 
values of effects of transparency. The effects of transparency are -.359 in the first 
model and -.345 in the second in provinces with strong civil society. The effects 
become stronger which are -.375 and -.351 in the provinces with weak civil society. 
Therefore, the results suggest that the less the vitality of civil society, the greater the 
effect of transparency on corruption. This rejects the hypothesis: The greater the 
vitality of civil society, the greater the effect of transparency on corruption.  
 
Table 3 The estimated effect of dichotomized civil society density on corruption under varying 
conditions (OLS) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Constant 
.636*** 
(.141) 
.418 
(.154) 
-.376 
(.606) 
-.160 
(.577) 
.515** 
(.142) 
.325** 
(.147) 
  
 
Early Corruption 
 .576** 
(.226) 
 .529** 
(.251) 
 .617** 
(.234) 
 
Low CSO 
-.034 
(.185) 
.011 
(.168) 
1.405* 
(.741) 
.999 
(.721) 
.115 
(.206) 
.127 
(.187) 
 
Transparency 
-.375 
(.269) 
-.351 
(.244) 
    
 
Low CSO * Transparency 
.019 
(.336) 
.006 
(.304) 
    
 
Education 
  .092 
(.067) 
.047 
(.067) 
  
 
Low CSO * Education 
  -.160* 
(.082) 
-.110 
(.080) 
  
 
Internet 
    -.202 
(.400) 
-.288 
(.361) 
 
Low CSO * Internet 
    -.316 
(.517) 
-.229 
(.466) 
 
N 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
29 
 
R2adj 
 
.088 
 
.253 
 
.055 
 
.169 
 
.011 
 
.201 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Standard error within parentheses. “Low CSO” is dichotomous and coded 
such that one equals to powerful civil society. 
 
Model 3 indicates that the effects of education on corruption are positive for 
provinces with weak civil society (b=.092). Education shows a positive effect on 
reducing corruption when provinces with vibrant civil society (b=-.068). The results 
in model 4 show same findings: with weak civil society b=.047 and with strong civil 
society b=-.063. Therefore, the hypothesis: "the greater the vitality of civil society, the 
greater the effect of education on reducing corruption" can be accepted. Fifth and 
sixth models explore the effects of Internet penetration, CSOs density, and their 
interaction terms on corruption. The effect is greater for provinces with a higher 
density of civil society (-.518) as opposed to provinces with a lower level of Internet 
penetration (-.202). The effects are correspondingly (-.517) and (-.288). Hence, the 
hypothesis the greater the vitality of civil society, the greater the effect of Internet 
penetration on reducing corruption gains support.  
 
Table 4 bases on the models in Table 3, the other two conditional variables are added 
  
to the regressions as control variables. Model 1 and 2 explore the effects of 
transparency on corruption for provinces with or without strong civil society. The 
results indicate the inverse findings as Table 3 shown. The effects of transparency on 
corruption increase for provinces have powerful civil society even if other two 
conditional variables are entered, i.e. the effects change from -.359 to -.431 and from 
-.345 to -.376 when corruption between 2003 and 2007 is controlled for. In addition, 
the effect for provinces with active civil society is stronger than the effect for 
provinces with weak civil society. Therefore, the hypothesis: "The greater the vitality 
of civil society, the greater the effect of transparency on corruption" gets support. 
Powerful civil society can contribute transparency to reduce corruption more 
effectively. Model 3 and 4 reveal the effects of education on corruption for provinces 
with or without powerful civil society. However, regardless of whether civil society is 
viable, the results of the regression do not show that education has a positive impact 
on the fight against corruption, i.e. all the effects of education on corruption (.206 
and .159) or when add up the effects with the interaction terms (.055 and .047) are 
positive. The results are opposite to the findings in table 3. Therefore, the hypothesis: 
the greater the vitality of civil society, the greater the effect of education on reducing 
corruption that was rejected in this table instead accepted when including two more 
conditional variables. Fifth and sixth models explore the effects of Internet 
penetration, CSOs density, and their interaction terms on corruption with other two 
conditional variables and control variable.  
 
Table 4 The estimated effect of dichotomized civil society density on corruption including two 
other conditional variables as control variables (OLS) 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
 
Constant 
-.150 
(.481) 
-.156 
(.439) 
-.998 
(.596) 
-.768 
(.576) 
-.236 
(.457) 
-.213 
(.420) 
-.455 
(1.203) 
-.257 
(1.134) 
-.350 
(1.18) 
Early 
Corruption 
 .533*** 
(.226) 
 .433* 
(.225) 
 .514** 
(.225) 
.547** 
(.237) 
.384 
(.247) 
.522** 
(.237) 
 
InGDP 
      .038 
(.146) 
-.083 
(.158) 
.018 
(.147) 
  
 
Low CSO 
.089 
(.191) 
.113 
(.175) 
1.386** 
(.655) 
1.056 
(.643) 
.201 
(.195) 
.191 
(.179) 
.112 
(.179) 
1.246 
(.747) 
.187 
(.186) 
 
Transparency 
-.291 
(.279) 
-.255 
(.256) 
-.344* 
(.169) 
-.314* 
(.160) 
-.387** 
(.180) 
-.339* 
(.166) 
-.239 
(.268) 
-.349* 
(.176) 
-.330* 
(.184) 
Low CSO * 
Transparency 
-.140 
(.337) 
-.121 
(.308) 
    -.117 
(.315) 
  
 
Education 
.108* 
(.061) 
.083 
(.057) 
.206** 
(.074) 
.159** 
(.074) 
.113* 
(.059) 
.087 
(.055) 
.073 
(.069) 
.196* 
(.103) 
.082 
(.068) 
Low CSO * 
Education 
  -.151** 
(.072) 
-.112 
(.071) 
   -.133 
(.083) 
 
 
Internet 
-.667 
(.392) 
-.605 
(.359) 
-.672 
(.352) 
-.615* 
(.334) 
-.390 
(.445) 
-.390 
(.409) 
-.689 
(.480) 
-.444 
(.471) 
-.435 
(.555) 
Low CSO * 
Internet 
    -.485 
(.481) 
-.375 
(.445) 
  -.363 
(.465) 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R2adj .140 .282 .273 .350 .170 .300 .250 .328 .267 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Standard error within parentheses. “Low CSO” is dichotomous and coded 
such that one equals to powerful civil society. GDP per capita in 2011 derived from National Statistical 
Bureau. The paper takes the logarithm of GDP per capita. 
 
The effects of Internet penetration and interaction terms are negative. The results 
indicate that Internet has a positive impact on reducing corruption no matter the 
density of civil society. The finding presented here evinces the same pattern as shown 
in the previous table when transparency and education are not added. This validates 
the hypothesis again. It supports that the greater the density of civil society, the 
greater the effect of Internet penetration on reducing corruption. Moreover, Model 7,8, 
and 9 add GDP per capita as control variable, respectively based Mode 2, 4, and 6, for 
further testing whether th significant results in previous 6 models are real or due to the 
effects of some important omitted variables. The results of these three models reflect 
that the significant results in previous models are true and believeable. Transparency 
and early level of corruption remains significant. 
 
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
The political and economic reform in China results in the endogenous vulnerability of 
institutions. While decentralization provides discretion for local government, it 
  
increases tensions between central government and local governments. The traditional 
system of intra-Party oversight and capacity of self-healing constantly dysfunctional. 
This is the main factor to result in gradually deteriorate corruption in China. 
Fortunately, the rise of societal accountability and government’s supports on 
combating corruption by the public may elevate the role of civil society in fighting 
corruption. In the context of such environment, this paper came into being. The paper 
aims to discuss the role of societal accountability in fighting China’s systemic 
corruption. Hence, the paper not only explores whether societal accountability in 
China can promote potential active conditions as previous literature proposed for 
combating corruption, but also investigate whether these conditions contributes 
societal accountability to reduce corruption. The determinants of China’s corruption 
and the characteristics of societal accountability mechanisms determine most relevant 
three conditions which are applied in the study: education, transparency, and Internet 
penetration. 
 
The results of the study are as follows. Table 2 examines how societal accountability 
might affect corruption when three conditions are weaker or absent in different 
provinces. Table 3 and 4 examine how weaker or stronger societal accountability 
might affect three conditions on reducing corruption. The findings from Table 2 
reveals that if a high level of education in place, a stronger civil society means lower 
corruption. Other two conditions do not show any active contribution against 
corruption. The finding suggests that education is the foundation of civil society to 
fight corruption. After all civil society density has no correlation with the level of 
corruption at the lower level of education. It demonstrates the findings of previous 
research in the Chinese context. The population of receiving higher education 
determines whether social groups can gain information about corrupt behavior and 
process the information to choose appropriate methods to report corruption. The 
results derived from Table 3 indicate that if stronger civil society in place, education 
and the Internet can reduce independently corruption, i.e. powerful civil society 
  
improves the ability of Internet and education on reducing corruption without other 
influences. The results changed when brings all the conditions into regressions in the 
models in Table 4. Stronger civil society can only benefit transparency and the 
Internet to fight against corruption. The changes reflect education may cannot assist in 
reducing corruption under the influence of Internet and Transparency. This does not 
negate the importance of education for fighting corruption. This means education 
affects little on corruption in this paper. Certainly, data selecting and processing of 
education may have defects. Multicollinearity may explain the result. Internet 
penetration plays an important role in fighting corruption as expected. Disagreements 
between the central government and local governments result in central governments 
in encountering difficulties of assessing information. Central government encourages 
people to report graft via the Internet. The Internet gets through the crux passway 
between the public and central government. The results, in term of Internet 
Penetration, show that if strong associational life available, the Internet can lower the 
level of corruption in both independent or collaborated situation. It should be noted 
that although the Internet itself may reduce corruption without civil society. But the 
finding suggests that the greater the density of civil society, the greater the effect of 
Internet penetration on reducing corruption. With the help of societal accountability, 
the Internet can combat corruption more effective. Transparency also shows positive 
effect against corruption. However, it cannot abate corruption individually. This is in 
line with the conclusion in the literature review, as the paper mentioned above,“just 
making information available will not prevent corruption if such conditions for 
publicity and accountability as education, media circulation and free and fair elections 
are weak”. (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010) In addition, it is worth noting that the 
"transparency" variable has a negative correlation with the dependent variable in all 
the models. And it shows a strong significance in four models in Table 4. The 
interaction terms of CSOs density and transparency also has a negative correlation 
with the level of corruption. These findings may reveal the positive effects of 
transparency on abating the probability of corruption. In addition, “Transparency” 
  
variable is derived from “Information Disclosure Index” in the provincial government 
website performance evaluation. This data is not used in previous research in this field. 
This may inspire further research to consider the value of this data when conducting 
related research.                  
 
To sum up, the research of thesis is only a preliminary attempt to study the role of 
societal accountability in combating corruption under Chinese unique political and 
economic system. This thesis may contribute future research to rethink the role of 
societal accountability in authoritarian regimes. There must be some deficiencies 
involve selecting and processing data due to the constraints of time and capacity. The 
sample size is small, only 29 samples, due to the thesis bases on the provincial level. 
This may result in the insignificant results of some models. Further research might 
expand the research to the municipal level. The increase of the sample size may 
resolve the challenge in this paper. Moreover, there are no other control variables 
available in this paper like other articles in the same field. This is because of the paper 
attempt to make the results of the empirical analyses significant to the greatest extent. 
The paper considered adding some control variables, such as the average income of 
civil servants and fiscal revenue of local governments. But the regression results show 
completely insignificant. Therefore, the paper leaves out these variables and focus on 
the main variables. The result shows that the change has good practicability and 
validity. Some variables are significant at least. Overall, societal accountability may 
play an important role in fighting corruption in China. Chinese people and 
government should realize fully the active effect of societal accountability on figting 
corruption, especially under the fact that the overriding pursuit of economic 
development results in the neglect of development of accountability mechanism. To 
go by appearances, perhaps it is difficult for people or governments to imagine the 
direct association between societal accountability and anti-corruption mechanism. In 
fact, although not all civil society density varaiables show direct positive effects on 
reducing level of corruption in this paper, but strong civil society enhances the 
  
capacity of transparency and the Internet on fighting corruption, i.e. transparency and 
rate of Internet penetration have greater effects on the level of corruption with high 
density of social organizations. Societal accountability as a branch of bottom-up 
vertical accountability is what the Chinese central government needs for resolving 
defects of political institutions and resolving the conflicts with the local governments 
when traditional top-down accountability is out of order, in terms of combating 
corruption. To reinforce the linkage on fighting corruption may be a wise investment 
between societal accountability and transparency for China.  
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